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Abstract: "Too big to fail" and "systemically important" are catch phrases in current 
debates  about  the relation  between democracy  and  the  market  economy.  It  is 
characteristic of this relation that certain questions do not even enter the political 
agenda partly  because  of  the  size  of  economic  agents.  For key  actors  in  the 
financial sector like big banks or pension funds are what has been referred to as 
"too big to fail" or "systemically important", meaning that their behavior can pose a 
long-term  threat  to  the  economic  system.  Contrary  to  neoliberal  theory,  these 
actors are unable to establish a regulatory regime for guaranteeing the collective 
good of a functioning financial market system. Unlike a democratic state, they are 
not "systemically important",  meaning "being important for the preservation of a 
system’s functions". A democratic state’s capacity to rescue financial institutions by 
levying  taxes  depends  on  the  loyalty  of  the  citizens. In  order  to  secure  this 
systemically important civic loyalty, it is necessary to limit the role of citizens as 
economic  actors.  This  limitation  is  only  one  kind  of establishing  boundaries. 
Boundaries disrupt chains of causality. The reasons for and against boundaries as 
suitable means to rescuing and enabling democratic politics should be discussed 
more intensively.
Keywords: Democracy, financial market crisis, "too big to fail" –problem, Knightian 
risk,  self-regulation of markets, neoliberalism, collective goods and evils,  power, 
citizen’s roles, citizenship, rationality of citizens, civic loyalty, borders, boundaries, 
size. 
1 This  text  is  a revised and extended version of  my article  "Bürgerschaft  und 
Marktwirtschaft. Oder was ist eigentlich systemrelevant?", in the German social 
studies journal Mittelweg 36, Vol. 19 (April/Mai 2010), pp. 38 –50. A partir de la 
página 29 se publica la traducción realizada sobre esta versión en inglés y la 
versión alemana.
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8 LUTZ WINGERT 
any democracies in modern times have by now two problems of 
size. The one is well known. It is related to the mere numeric 
size  of  the  population  in  contemporary  democratic  legislative 
states. The other problem of size is called "too big to fail". It consists in the 
consequences for democratic decision making processes which is as big as 
banks, insurance companies and pension funds.
M
"Democracy" that is the name for a government that rules over the 
people, for the people, through the people. "Over the people" states a rule 
of law: No one is outside the law, neither Putin, nor Berlusconi or Rodrigo 
Rato, the former head of the Spanish savings bank Bankia, which caused 
billions  of  losses  for  the  tax  payers.  "Government  for  the  people"  is 
supposed to mean this: The laws are good for everyone and not just for the 
strong or the lobbyist. And "government through the people" means that the 
people decide on the laws, which are to hold for them. Who falls under the 
laws must participate in law-giving processes.2
That is why it is intuitive to imagine the democracy as an assembly 
democracy ("beer hall democracy"): The ones concerned -- at least adults 
and the healthy ones -- meet to participate in law giving. In the 5th and 4th 
century BC Athens it was not unusual for 5000 or 6000 of 21.000 eligible 
citizens to meet.3 In Swiss Glarus, a canton with 26.000 citizens entitled to 
vote, 5000 citizens have recently met to decide on draft laws of the regional 
parliament (They have been doing that for 625 years.) But in spite of the 
technical possibilities of the internet this assembly democracy seems to be 
not feasible if one thinks of the hundreds of thousand or millions of citizen, 
who live in regions like Andaluz or Essex and in cities like Sao Paolo or 
2 Political  laws  are  decisions  in  legal  form.  The  decisions  are  expressed  in 
sentences without  proper names. They are binding for  a collective that  also 
includes foreigners. "Foreign" refers to the opposite of family member.
3 Nippel, Wilfried Antike oder moderne Freiheit? Die Begründung der Demokratie  
in Athen und in der Neuzeit, Frankfurt/M. 2008. Ober, Joshua, What the ancient 
Greeks can tell us about democracy, in: Annual Review of Political Science (11) 
2008,  following  M.  H.  Hansen,  The  Athenian  Assembly  in  the  Age  of  
Demosthenes, Oxford 1987.
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Warsaw and who would have to meet, that is, if they wanted to meet.
"Representative democracy" is the name of one attempt to solve this 
problem of  the  size  of  citizenship.  Representation  is  supposed to make 
those people and aspects present who are absent, but still important for the 
legitimacy and the reasonability of the decisions. That way absent citizens 
are  supposed  to  get  a  word  via  their  representatives:  for  example  via 
parliamentary members, mayors, ministers, political parties, heads of trade 
unions  or  chambers  of  commerce,  and  so  on.  One  of  the  problematic 
threats  for  representative  democracy  is  that  the  connection  between 
represented citizens and their representatives becomes too loose. How can 
the order of representation and the representatives alike make the voices of 
and the perspectives of the absent people present so that the decision is 
responsive  to  those  concerned?  That  is  one problem  of  democratic 
representation.  It  is  also  related  to  the size  of  the  circle  of  the  people 
concerned.
The  second problem of  size of  democracy has nothing to do with 
what happens in the political decision making process of pro and con. It is 
rather connected to that which precedes such political decisions. Certain 
questions do not even become the topic of political debates and decisions. 
That is partly because of the size that certain economic agents have. Why, 
for  example,  should  tax  financed  states  rescue private  banks and save 
insurance companies or investments funds from severe losses? After the 
collapse of the US-American Lehman Brothers Bank in September 2008 
this question is not asked in Europe and in the USA anymore. It has been 
answered positively even before it was put up for political discussion. 
If one acts naively for a moment this question suggests itself. This is 
because the employment  of  social  resources for  such a bank bailout  is 
clearly very high, that is, the use of tax money and the state garnishment of 
the incomes, which the work capacity of people will produce in the future. 
(This garnishment manifest itself in the form of state debts.)
In 2010 alone the financial support of tax states in the EU, that is, 
guarantees  and  liquidity  measures,  recapitalisation  and  impaired  assets 
came to the almost unfathomable sum of 1105,2 billion Euro. That amounts 
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to  9%  of  the  GNP  of  EU-countries.4 In  Great  Britain  official  numbers 
estimate that the previous cost of bank rescue totals 140 Million Pounds.5 
In the USA the rescue program TARP (Trouble Asset Relief Program) has 
since October 2008 and until now (=July 2012) caused losses of around 16 
billion Dollars for the tax paying community. Open bills of around 124 billion 
US-Dollars  are  not  even  included  in  this  calculation.  The  insurance 
company AIG alone owes 36 billion Dollars. 6 According to estimates of the 
budget  office  in  the  US-American Congress  CBO from March 2012 the 
rescue  measure  TARP  will  cost  32  billion  Dollars.7 Another  US-office 
estimates around 68 billion Dollar.8 For comparison: in 2010 the expenses 
for medicare, i.e. for government health insurance of pensioners amounted 
to 245 billion Dollar.9 The expenses of food stamps for starving US-citizens, 
amongst those 1,8 million people in the city of New York were at 68 million 
Dollars in the financial year 2010.10 -- A last example from Europe: In Spain 
the formerly private savings bank  Bankia will according to estimates from 
May 2012 cost tax payers 12 billion Euro.11 In order to finance such bank 
4 Cf. Vgl. European Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper Autumn 2011 
Update (1st December 2011), = {COM (2011 848 final}, Figure 2, p. 8. 
5 According  to  Mark  Hobart,  secretary  of  the  British  Treasury,  cited  in 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, June 19, 2012, p. 25: "Schwer zu bändigen".
6 Cf.  Office  of  the  Special  Inspection  General  for  the  Trouble  Asset  Relief 
Program (SIGTARP), Quarterly Response to Congress, July 25, 2012: Figure 
2.1, p. 37 f. indicating the realized loss of 16 billions US-Dollar. As regards the 
number about AIG: See figure 2.2, pp. 40, 48. On outstanding repayments see 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Report on Trouble Asset Relief Program – 
March  2012,  Figure  2.  p.  4,  retrieved  on  July  27,  2012,  via 
<www.cbo.gov/publication/43139>.
7 Cf. CBO, Report on Trouble Asset Relief Program – March 2012. (= March 28, 
2012), Infographic.
8 The agency is  called  "Office  of  Management and Budget"  (OMB),  with data 
basis  from  November  30,  2011.  See  as  a  source:  Office  of  the  Special 
Inspection General for the Trouble Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP), Quarterly 
Response to Congress, July 25, 2012, , Table 2.3, p. 42 (= cf. endnote 5).
9 Cf. Financial Times Deutschland, December 13, 2011, p. 23: Armes Amerika".
10 Cf.  Süddeutsche  Zeitung,  April  14,  2010:  "Obamacare  –  das 
Jahrhundertprojekt".
11 Cf. Financial Times Deutschland, May 24, 2012, p. 17: "Spanien stützt Bankia 
mit mindestens 9 Mrd. Euro".
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rescues  the  government  also  shortens  the  budget  for  orphanages  and 
homes for the disabled. In Mataro near Barcelona, for example, caregivers 
hardly got there monthly wage of 1.300 Euro in the summer of 2012. 12
One  could  ask,  whether  one  shouldn’t  spend  more  money  on 
orphanages and food aid and less money on bank bailouts.  Why is this 
question  so naive?  Because --  that  is  the standard reply  --  there is  no 
alternative  to  bank  bailouts  and  stabilisation  of  world-wide  financial 
markets.  The  agents  on  these  markets:  investment  banks,  financial 
institutes  with  retail-banking  services  like  insured  deposit-taking  and 
payment services, hedge funds, insurance companies, pensions funds etc 
are often too big for us to let them fail. The damage would be unbearably 
high.
In the first  instance the "size" of  those agents refers to something 
monetary like the total  assets of banks, the amount of a pension funds’ 
portfolio market value, or a bank’s debt to equity ratio. That is "size" in the 
sense of a set of elements according to a unit. In the second instance "size" 
has to be understood more abstractly: "size" here refers to the cause of a 
certain type of risks.
Generally  speaking  a  risk  is  a  probability  relation  between  the 
occurrence of negative causal effects and the occurrence of positive effects 
of an action or forbearance. A risk for judgers and agents consists either in 
(1)  insecurity  about  which of  the known and limited number  of  possible 
causal  effects  will  occur,  or  in  (2)  insecurity,  what  possible  causal 
consequences might be. 13 In a throw of a dice one is insecure which face 
the dice will show. This is the first type of insecurity, since in that case one 
knows which possible faces there are. That does not hold for the second 
type of insecurity. 
The  size  of  economic  agents  referred  to  in  the  "too  big  to  fail"  - 
12 Cf. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, August 8, 2012, p. 29: "Tragödie mit halbem 
Chor".
13 As is generally known the distinction between (1) and (2) was coined by the 
economist Frank H. Knight. Knight calls insecurity (1) "risk" and insecurity (2) 
"uncertainty". Cf. F.H. Knight,  Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit  (1921), New York: 
Harper Torchbooks 1965, p. 233; 223 ff.
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context is the cause of effects which belong to insecurity (2). This size is 
associated with unmanageable causal interconnectedness or complexity of 
economic agents.  The risk here is connected with insecurity about  what 
could happen if banks or insurance companies of a certain monetary size 
and  connectedness  collapse.  The  consequence  of  this  is  that  political 
measures against this collapse, just like actions against natural disasters, 
are excluded from political debates. Yet, things do not stop at non-recurring 
disaster operations, since the danger of a collapse of big economic agents 
builds up again and again. It is because of this danger, too, that for several 
years the political elite in Europe have been extending the elimination of 
democratic politics.  The elimination of  the budget  sovereignty of  elected 
parliaments  in  the  Euro-zone  countries  by  the  European  Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) in June 2012 so far is the clearest example.14
The magic phrase used to justify this elimination of democratic politics 
is  "systemically  important"  or  "too  big  to  fail".  But  what  actually  is 
"systemically  important"?  And  what  can  the  smoldering  global  financial 
crisis  tell  us about  the role of  the economy in Western societies with a 
democratic polity?
I. Functions of financial markets and the inability of financial 
market players to regulate themselves
One of the functions of financial markets is to move capital from one 
side that does not currently need it to another side that does. They are also 
supposed  to  transfer  capital  from  entrepreneurially  inactive  hands  to 
entrepreneurially  active  ones.  Those  functions  are  fundamental 
characteristics of  the financial  market  system.  The performance of  such 
14 Cf.  "Treaty  Establishing  The  European  Stability  Mechanism",  Brussels  1st 
February 2012. The Board of Governors (= the 17 ministers of finance of the 
Euro-states) is allowed to change the authorised capital stock (cf. article 10 of 
the "Treaty"). According to article 9 the Board of Directors may call in capital 
from the national member states by simple majority to restore the level of the 
authorised  capital  stock.  The  directors  are  so  called  economic  experts, 
accordingly appointed by the national governments. Cf. European Commission 
Brussels: <htpp://europe.eu>, keyword "ESM".
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tasks by a properly functioning financial market is entirely compatible with a 
generalizable,  publicly  defensible  interest  in  efficient  operation  of  the 
economy. Players in the financial market system are systemically important 
if their failure results in the non-performance of functions within the system 
that cannot be performed by anyone else.  Clearly,  banks and insurance 
companies have been, and remain, unable to prevent the failure of those 
functions. They are systemically important in the sense of their potential to 
pose a fundamental risk, but not to come to the rescue.
Amid the profusion of proposals to limit  risks that are either being 
floated or have been implemented, it is noteworthy that these private sector 
market participants have been keeping a very low profile:
Only recently the International Institute for Finance (IIF) has called for 
new financial assistance amounting to 20 billion for Greece and its private 
banks by the EU. The idea of asking its 450 members for such assistance 
did not even occur to this association of global players. Though this would 
not have been absurd. After all 48 of 130 Euro-billions of the second rescue 
package went to Greek banks.15 Probably the most recent Greek debt cut 
was too fresh on the Institute’s mind. The IIF only just managed to secure 
the participation of private creditors under the faithfully promised condition 
that this participation would be non-recurrent.
In  Germany the Association  of  German Banks may have voted in 
favor  of  a  private  bad  bank,15 but  it  insisted  that  the  "toxic"  securities 
transferred  to  it  should  be  underwritten  largely  by  guarantees  from  a 
government-owned  institute  (Soffin)  that  is  sponsored  by  Germany’s 
taxpayers. And the introduction of genuinely neutral rating agencies within 
the sector  shows no sign of  materializing.  It  is  true that  the creation of 
Eurex as a European clearing house for credit default swaps (CDSs) is a 
move  by  the  banks  designed  to  promote  transparency  and  thereby 
encourage  confidence  in  interbank  trading.16 As  with  commodity  futures 
15 Cf.  Financial  Times  Deutschland,  February  2,  2009,  p.  15:  "Private  wollen 
eigene Bad Bank".
16 Cf.  Wall  Street  Online,  December  15.12,  2008:  http://www.wallstreet-
online.de/nachricht/264565.html, retrieved on March 31, 2009; cf. also Financial 
Times Deutschland, March 11, 2009, p.17.
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exchanges,  when  trading  CDSs  banks  deal  with  others  only  via  an 
intermediary,  funded  by  fees,  that  acts  as  a  guarantor  –  the  central 
counterparty.  But  this  initiative  came  about  only  "in  the  shadow  of  the 
hierarchy",  in  other  words  in  response  to  governments  threatening  to 
impose stricter capital requirements on financial institutions trading in such 
derivatives.  The  volume  of  credit  intermediated  by  shadow  banks,  e.g. 
investment  funds  or  securities  lenders,  was  16  Billion  Dollars  in  2010, 
whereas the volume of credit intermediated by traditional banks amounted 
to  13  Billion  Dollars.  Until  now,  no  strong  efforts  have  been  made  to 
regulate the shadow banking system.
Also, the European Union leaves it open until at least 2013 how high 
the liquid securities (the collateralls) with which traders of derivatives cover 
possible payment obligations have to be.17 Why exactly is it that economic 
agents always want less securities than state lawmakers? Why can’t they 
themselves limit their own risky size?
"We cannot rely on the banks regulating themselves", the economist 
and market fundamentalist Horst Siebert noted some time ago.18 If we are 
to  avoid  backing  the  wrong  horse  again  next  time  round,  we  need  to 
understand  why  we  cannot  rely  on  (capital)  market  players  regulating 
themselves.
Markets  are  price-setting  competitions  over  opportunities  for 
exchange  with  rival  players.  The  maintenance  of  a  functioning  financial 
market  benefits  all  market  participants.  For  that  reason,  a  bank  that 
contributes to the maintenance of the market does not thereby gain any 
advantage over other, rival actors. In the market, there is no premium for 
acting in a way that benefits all alike. Literally, one cannot sell more or buy 
more  as  a  result.  Self-regulation  does  not  pay.  The  failure  of  market 
17 Cf.  Sebastien  Dullien,  "Anspruch  und  Wirklichkeit  der  Finanzmarktreform: 
Welche G20-Versprechen wurden umgesetzt?", Macroeconomic Policy Institute 
(IMK) Berlin, March 2012, p. 11 f. See also Marc Roche, Le capitalisme hors la  
loi, Paris 2011. 
18 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, October 25, 2008, p. 11: "»Horst Siebert, Ein 
Regelwerk für die Finanzmärkte".
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participants  to  coordinate  their  actions  is  therefore  no  accident.19 This 
failure of banks to self-regulate for the common good is the worst possible 
outcome in  terms of  regulatory policy  for  advocates of  the real  existing 
global  market  economy.  Their  credo,  "When everyone thinks of  himself, 
everyone’s needs are considered", has revealed itself  for what it  always 
was: an ideology immune to experience.
Some  observers  are  demanding  more  virtue  on  the  market.  The 
traders and brokers at Wall Street, Frankfurt, or London’s Canary Wharf 
should  become  again  honest  businessmen.  These  supporters  of  the 
revived  concept  of  the  honest  businessman  may  object  against  the 
argument  in  the  preceding  paragraph  that  the  preference  for  obtaining 
comparative advantages over rivals need not always prevail. For them, a 
preference for not suffering a lasting disadvantage compared with others 
will suffice. The proponent of self-regulation, therefore, is characterized by 
a  more modest  preference:  not  to  improve one’s  position  by helping  to 
resolve the crisis, but merely to avoid being worse off over the long term.
However,  a  few  compulsory  ethics  lessons  at  business  schools 
explaining  how to  create  character  masks  are  unlikely  on  their  own  to 
ensure that preferences are formed in this way. It may be that there are 
CEOs belonging to the old school of honest businessmen, indeed. But even 
they act  as an agent  on behalf  of  the principal,  that is the shareholder. 
What form of shareholder responsibility could one appeal to? What kind of 
legal sanctions could be employed?
The  proposal  for  self-imposed  undertakings  rather  than  externally 
imposed shackles goes no further toward answering these questions. This 
idea consists in a symbolic contract agreed between the Western world’s 
major  financial  institutions  and  the  regulators.20 In  return  for  the  state 
19 The economists Franklin Allen and Elena Carletti talk of a failure of coordination 
but neglect to ask whether, given the frequency of such defects, that failure of 
coordination on the part of financial institutions is accidental or unavoidable. Cf.  
F. Allen/E. Carletti, "Financial System: shock absorber or amplifier?", Working 
Paper August 2008, published by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).
20 This  proposal  comes from two professors  of  finance at  the Stern School  of 
Business  of  New York  University,  Roy C.  Smith  and Ingo  Walter:  "Wie  die 
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agreeing  not  to  impose  measures  such  as  more  stringent  capital  and 
liquidity  requirements,  the dominant  players undertake not  to use equity 
capital for speculative purposes, hide balance sheet items in off-balance-
sheet special purpose companies, and so on.
But the fact is that the leading players are in competition with each 
other. The proposal cannot work unless they neutralize this relationship in 
favour  of  a  binding  commitment  to  collective  action.  Even  if  such  an 
arrangement  were  to  succeed  and  the  banks  genuinely  practiced 
cooperation instead of competition, they would run the risk of their investors 
deserting them for smaller market players that would continue to play the 
old game, shielded by the absence of regulation.
There is no doubt that similar things can and do occur, all the time, 
outside the market sphere and in the earthly lives of normal people such as 
us. The difference is that in the markets, such happenings cannot even be 
discussed – let alone, where necessary, denounced. For, in the language 
of  the  market  duties  and  rights  become risks  of  costs  and  chances  of 
benefits. A concomitant of the invisible hand is the (deontic) muteness of 
the market processes that, supposedly, are guided by it.
II. The systemic importance of the citizens’ loyalty
Faced  with  market  participants’  proven  inability  to  regulate 
themselves, economists talk of the state as "lender or buyer of last resort".21 
So  it  is  hardly  surprising  that,  in  this  role,  the  state  is  "systemically 
important". Here, though, the systemic importance lies not in the potential 
Banken aus der Defensive herauskommen können", cf. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 
January 25, 2010, p. 10.
21 Cf.  e.g.  Dennis  J.  Snower,  "Ein  Rettungsplan  für  das  international 
Finanzsystem", Institut für Weltwirtschaft, Working paper IfW-Fokus 48, October 
7, 2008, p. 1. Cf on the same statist focus the collection of essays by a group of 
Swiss  economists  from  the  University  of  St.  Gallen  (=HSG):  Responsible 
Corporate  Competiveness  (publ.),  Konsequenzen  aus  der  Finanzmarktkrise. 
Perspektiven der  HSG,  St.  Gallen 2009;  likewise Stern School  of  Business, 
Restoring Financial Stability: How to Repair a Failed System, source: Executive 
Summaries  http://www.  whitepapers.  stern.nyn.edu/home.html,  retrieved  on 
September 24, 2009.
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to jeopardize a function that defines the system, but rather in the state’s 
essential capacity to rescue that system. "Given that, precisely because of 
the crisis, the financial system is not in a position to provide the loans to 
financial institutions that are necessary (to overcome the crisis, L.W.), the 
only alternative is the state. The state can take on debt in the crisis and 
reduce  it  in  future  because  it  enjoys  tax  sovereignty  (...)",  commented 
representatives  of  a  German  institute  for  economic  research.22 But  tax 
sovereignty is only one side of the coin.  The other,  habitually  neglected 
side is the loyalty of citizens to the community that is embodied in the state. 
The tax state is founded on this willingness to offer support. So it is not the 
case  that  the  state  alone,  with  its  immense  power  of  sanction,  is 
systemically important. The loyalty of citizens, too, is systemically important 
– unless the state is uncoupled from democracy.
Citizen loyalty is something other than the willingness of more far-
sighted economic citizens to offer their support because they appreciate the 
economic advantages of state rescue packages. Citizens are not merely 
synonymous  with  economic  citizens.23 Economic  citizens  are  market 
participants in the roles of consumers purchasing, investors, and producers 
selling (including sellers of labor). But not everyone who creates something 
is a seller, and not every consumer is a buyer. Citizens also inhabit social 
spheres that do not coincide with the market sphere, and in which other 
rationalities apply.
This  difference  in  rationalities  can  be  seen  in  the  positive  and 
negative effects that market processes have on those other social spheres. 
Such  externalities  are  not  always  experienced  simply  as  financially 
advantageous or disadvantageous;  they may also be viewed as alien or 
inappropriate.  Unlike  a clinic  manager,  a doctor  treating  a  chronically  ill 
patient considers it not only disadvantageous but also inappropriate if he is 
expected to treat that patient on the basis of a flat fee. Unlike an investor 
22 Ulrich  Blum/Diemo  Dietrich,  "Risiko  statt  Rettung",  cf.  Financial  Times 
Deutschland, January 5, 2010, p. 24.
23 Cf.  also  Robert  Reich,  Supercapitalism.  The  Transformation  of  Business,  
Democracy, and Everyday Life, New York 2007.
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with  risk  capital  or  a  university  bureaucrat,  a  scientist  concerned  with 
pushing  back  the  frontiers  of  knowledge  will  not  select  her  potential 
subjects of research on the basis of the financial benefits from marketing 
patents: for her, these are an alien point of reference.
Political  citizens  must  combine  the perspectives  of  different  social 
spheres and their rationalities. They face a double requirement: Firstly, they 
have to examine political decisions in relation to these multifaceted factors; 
in assessing them their aim has to be multi-dimensional optimizing, rather 
than  one-dimensional  maximization.  This  is  simply  due  to  the  fact  that 
political citizens are dealing with the concerns of a complex, work-sharing 
society organized as a res publica.
Secondly, political  citizens also have to approve the decisions with 
regard to the following question: What is good or better for all members of 
the community combined? This requirement is due to the demand for the 
community to be governed democratically. The civic loyalty consists in the 
readiness of members of a community to accept these requirements.
Someone  who  is  loyal  in  this  sense  certainly  asks  whose  policy 
accords with her interests. But to a certain degree she also asks: What is 
good for all together? This community perspective includes the readiness to 
accept occasional negative side effects of collective goods as burdens that 
one  can  be  expected  to  deal  with  and  not  just  as  inescapable, 
disadvantageous externalities.
It is fashionable to deride this expectation as unworldly and point to 
political  clientelism,  cynical  lobbying  and  meaningless,  formulaic 
compromises.  The transformation from economic citizens participating  in 
the market to a political  electorate does not in itself  make us into better 
people. But if we dismiss and abandon this expectation as unrealistic, in the 
same breath we also abandon the fundamental principle of a democratic 
community: that its decisions are in a publicly defensible interest – one that 
can be generally shared, and mutually justified.
It  may  be  that  economic  citizens  participating  in  the  market  are 
equally keen to adopt this perspective on the public interest and to view 
things  multi-dimensionally.  This  is  what  the  marketing  departments  of 
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companies mean when they speak of "corporate social responsibility". But 
this orientation is an ornamental extra. Unlike the political role as citizen, it 
is not essential to the market participant but rather extrinsic. In the market, 
the  contribution  to  realizing  a  publicly  defensible  interest  cannot  be 
translated into a position that  leaves the contributor  better  off  than rival 
market participants – unless other participants, such as consumers, act as 
political citizens and reward this contribution. This advantage is the ultima 
ratio of the competitors.24
The  overbearing  approach  of  Brussel’s  competition  commissars 
disregards the systemic importance of  the citizens'  loyalty.  For unless a 
stop mechanism is incorporated, it constantly expands the market mode of 
social coordination in an imperialistic and dictatorial manner. According to 
this,  people’s  thoughts  and  actions  should  primarily  be  guided  by  the 
economic  citizen  perspective  of  the  informed  investor,  purchasing 
consumer,  and  vendor-producer.  The  more  thoughts  and  actions  are 
informed  by  this  approach,  the  less  room  there  is  for  adopting  and 
exercising the necessary citizen’s perspective on the system as a whole. A 
full  blooded  economic  citizen  will  no  longer  think  of  paying  taxes  as 
something she ist obliged to. She will conceive of taxes as often avoidable 
costs. From such an economic citizen‘s perspective, it is reasonable to buy 
a luxury apartment in London instead of paying taxes as an Italian or Greek 
political citizen in Rome or Athens. After all, what argument could there be 
against  permitting  internet  exchanges  for  votes  in  the  name  of  private 
property rights and contractual freedom?
We might  ask  the commissars in  the  Brussels  headquarter  of  the 
contemporary  European  authoritarian  regime  what  kind  of  destabilizing 
herd mentality millions of savers would have demonstrated in the period 
following the collapse of Lehman Brothers Bank on September 15, 2008 if 
they had finally become fully professionalized economic citizens; if, before 
24 Richard  Posner  freely  admits  that  in  the  phase  before  the  manifest  crisis, 
"(bankers)  and consumers alike  seem on the whole  to  have been acting in 
conformity  with  their  rational  self-interest",  cf.  R.  Posner,  A  Failure  of  
Capitalism, Cambridge, Ma. 2009, p. 235.
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drinking their morning coffee, they had gone online to check how Tokyo 
had closed overnight  – after all,  the prices for their  own healthcare and 
pensions  are  listed on the exchange  there.  We may also  wonder  what 
dimensions  the  market  power  of  institutional  investors  such  as  pension 
funds would reach if the old European pay-as-you-go system for old-age 
and health  insurance were finally  brought  up to date by  switching  over 
entirely  to  a  funded  system  tapping  the  capital  markets.  Unlike  the 
institutions of a democratic community, market participants react only to the 
signals of purchasing power and defections. Any objection to their business 
conduct that appealed to fairness or pointed out the social hardship that it 
caused  would  fall  on  deaf  ears.  Clued-up  German  clients  of  Iceland’s 
bankrupted  Kaupthing  Bank  realized  that.  With  sound  instincts,  they 
demonstrated not in Frankfurt’s banking district but in Berlin’s government 
quarter to get some money back.
III. On the systemic importance of boundaries
The  question:  "What  exactly  is  systemically  important?"  has  now 
already been partly  answered.  There are two meanings of  "systemically 
important": Firstly, systemically important means something like "a threat to 
the system =so dangerous that the functions of a system are not fulfilled 
anymore". That is also what "too big to fail" means. The word "system" here 
stands  for  the  system  of  the  financial  market.  Secondly  "systemically 
important"  means  something  like  "important  for  the  preservation  of  a 
system or  its  functions".  Civic  loyalty  is  "systemically  important"  in  this 
second sense also for the system of the financial market, since without it 
the tax state  could  not  save e.g.  banks and insurance companies  from 
collapsing. In a nutshell: What is systemically important? -- Civic loyalty of 
citizens of a state.
A second answer is this: Boundaries are systemically important. This 
answer is suggested by the first answer. Since civic loyalty is systemically 
important, whatever sustains this loyalty is systemically important, too. Civic 
loyalty includes a perspective or an attitude that might wither because the 
Las Torres de Lucca
Nº 1 (julio-diciembre 2012): 7-55
Citizenship and the market economy... 21
roles  of  economic citizens dominate.  That  is  why these roles  related to 
markets have to be restricted. A delineation in the sense of a separation of 
spheres25 therefore is systemically important.
This separation of spheres also consists in role limitations. The role of 
the  professionalised  economic  citizen  has  to  be  one  among other  civic 
roles.  She is  wrongfully  turned into a cross-boundary social  ideal  if  one 
conceives  of  human  beings  as  contractors  who  sell  themselves  as 
products;  and  if  the  members  of  the  globalized  class  with  their  golden 
Credit  Cards  and  executive  positions  in  international  organisations  and 
corporate groups are chosen as role models and idols.
However, restricting the roles of the economic citizen to preserve the 
scope for citizen loyalty is only one instance of establishing systemically 
important boundaries. Boundaries disrupt chains of causality.26 Examples 
include firewalls, the blood-brain barrier, and the right to privacy. Firewalls 
prevent flames spreading to neighboring properties. The blood-brain barrier 
blocks  the  destabilizing  migration  of  certain  substances  from the  blood 
vessels  into  the  central  nervous  system.  The  right  to  privacy  prevents 
statements  and  information  being  picked  up  and  used  by  strangers. 
Functional boundaries are designed to promote a specific configuration of 
states,  procedures  or  activities.  Such  boundaries  are  systemically 
25 Unlike  Jürgen  Habermas,  Michael  Walzer  neglects  the  question  of  how the 
sphere of economic citizens and political citizens could be separated. Cf. his 
Spheres of Justice. A Defence of Pluralism and Equality, Oxford 1983, ch. 4: 
"Money and Commodities". But this question is also important for a theory of  
justice  which  Walzer  is  interested  in.  Without  separation  powerful  economic 
citizens  could  erode  the  principle  of  justice  of  the  equal  value  of  political 
citizenship.  This  principle  means  that  every  citizen  can  demand  from  the 
political institutions in a democracy that these institutions equally influence the 
social living conditions in her interests. -- John Rawls talks of the fair value of 
the same political liberties: Justice as Fairness. A Restatement, ed. Erin Kelly, 
Cambridge, Ma. 2001, § 345, pp. 148 ff. -- I do not claim that the principle of the 
equal value of political citizenships is identical with that which Rawls means. 
26 Prompted  by  Charles  Perrow,  Normal  Accidents.  With  a  New  Afterword, 
Princeton 1999. Cf.  also Stephen J. Mezias,  "Financial  Meltdown as Normal 
Accident:  The  Case  of  the  American  Savings  and  Loan  Industry",  in: 
Accounting, Organizations and Society 19 (1994), pp. 181–192.
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important; for a system is an interactive phenomenon ordered mainly by the 
functions that its elements carry out. (An organism, an ecological niche, a 
school, a firm, or a legal order are all instances of a system.)
Whether boundaries are good or bad is an open question. A firewall 
may protect against a wildfire, but it also cuts off lines of escape. The issue 
of the importance of boundaries to a macroeconomy or social economy is 
likewise  unanswered.  Boundaries  should  however  not  be  thought  of  in 
terms  of  self-limitations.  In  view  of  the  dramatic  incapacity  for  self-
regulation it is unrealistic to think in terms of establishing them in that way. 
This  incapacity  is  also  due  to  the  market  system’s  competition  itself. 
Statutory prohibitions  and prescriptions  as well  as incentives  channelled 
through  an  intelligent  design  of  options  are  more  promising  modes  of 
establishing borders.
This concerns the How, not the Why or the goals of the demarcation. 
There  are  at  least  two  goals:  (1)  Boundaries  are  meant  to  inhibit  the 
potential  of  threatening  system  functions.  And  (2)  they  are  meant  to 
increase rescue potential by making market participants respect collective 
evil. The latter cannot be achieved by appeals to the virtues of investors, 
bankers, and analysts, and even less by oaths that graduates of business 
schools  take,  since due to the prospect  of  profit  the level  of  customary 
criminality in the financial sector is simply too high.
(1)  Some varieties  of  a  demarcation  that  is  meant  to  reduce  the 
threats  are  discussed  under  the  keywords  "narrow  banking"  or  "ring 
fencing".27 This refers, inter alia,  to the separation of investment banking 
from  other  deposit-taking  business  in  order  to  delimit  the  possible 
27 Cf. e.g. the proposal of the British Treasury: HM Treasury, "Banking reform: 
delivering stability and supporting a sustainable economy", London (June) 2012, 
ch.  2: Ring-Fencing,  pp. 19 ff..  Cf.  Edmund S. Phelps (Columbia University, 
Center on Capitalism and Society), Letter (March 17, 2009) to the British prime 
minister Gordon Brown. The letter is the summary of a conference "Emerging 
from the Financial Crisis" that took place at New York in February 20, 2009. Cf. 
<http://capitalism.columbia.edu/files/ccs/CCSletterG20-2009_March
%2024Final.pdf>  retrieved  on  March  2,  2011.  Cf.  e.g. Randall  S. 
Kroszner/Robert  J.  Shiller,  Reforming  U.S.  Financial  Markets.  Reflections 
Before and Beyond Dodd-Frank, Cambridge, Ma. 2011.
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consequences of risky investment strategies. The causal chain is disrupted 
by  state  prohibitions.  The  demarcation  here  concerns  roles  or  fields  of 
activity.
The same applies to the proposal to impose strict limits on the role of 
rating  agencies.  Rating  agencies  must  not  simultaneously  be  arbiters 
valuing  the financial  products of  a company they are rating,  and actors 
profiting from the ratings of these products. As with a neutral  consumer 
organization,  limits  on  the  role  of  agencies  would  do  away  with  the 
profitable,  corrupting  link  between  their  dual  functions  of  advising  and 
valuing the issuing institutions. It would prevent situations such as occurred 
in  July  2009,  when  Goldman Sachs,  Credit  Suisse  et  al.  overruled  the 
judgment  of  Standard  &  Poor’s  and  insisted  on  a  more  favorable 
assessment.28
Establishing  borders includes time constraints,  too.  According to a 
proposal  by  the  economist  Edmund  Phelps  a  tax-linked,  tensed  border 
should be set up with respect to credit periods: A credit tax29 would force 
companies to pay a tax for taking on a very short-term rather than a longer-
term loan. The aim of this would be not only to encourage more far-sighted 
investment but also to block the impact of temporarily poor business results 
on liquidity for a certain period.
These are  examples for  establishing  boundaries  before a crisis  to 
come. Boundary-setting is also crucial in a manifest crisis, indeed. A bank’s 
living  will,  or  emergency  plans  to  combat  concentrations  of  risk,  which 
envisage predetermined breaking points for major banks, are instances of 
boundary-setting during a crisis.30 Operating within a controllable chain of 
causality, these predetermined breaking points would enable the selective 
28 Cf. Financial Times Deutschland, July 23, 2009: "S & P knickt vor Banken ein".
29 Phelps, "Emerging from the Financial Crises", , p. 4 (cf. endnote 26). In a similar  
vein is the proposal by the Governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King. King 
advocates  compulsory  "catastrophe  insurance"  for  banks,  to  finance 
government rescue measures. Cf. The Economist, October 24, 2009: "Too big 
to bail out", p. 41.
30 Schweizer Nationalbank, Financial Stability Report, Zurich June 2009, S. 10 for 
Switzerland. As regards the USA cf. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, July 6, 2012: "US-
Grossbanken legen ihren letzten Willen vor". 
Las Torres de Lucca
Nº 1 (julio-diciembre 2012): 7-55
24 LUTZ WINGERT 
rescuing  of  units  of  a  big  bank,  with  those  that  are  bankrupt  being 
separated off and wound down.
These examples of systemically important boundaries do not limit any 
specific  variables.  It  is  clear,  however,  that  systemically  important 
boundaries  also  have  to  do  with  variables,  such  as  the  often  mooted 
restriction on the leverage ratio – the ratio between common equity and 
assets.31 The total assets of the ailing insurance speculator AIG were many 
times the gross national product of Hungary.32 That is just as unacceptable 
as  it  would  be  for  the  economy  of  a  country  such  as  Hungary  to  be 
controlled by two or three people with private-law connections.
As already indicated, the variable that is to be limited here means the 
cause of a risk that is linked to uncertainty as to what the potential causal 
consequences may be.
Some economists favour rendering owners liable as a way of limiting 
such variables.33 In so doing, they rely on the deterrent effect of financial 
loss. But for this deterrent to be effective, a longer duration of liability -- 
among  other  requirements  --  would  be  needed,  so  as  to  close  off  the 
avenues of escape long before damage occurred. This conflicts with the 
freedom  of  contract  that  is  held  up  as  an  inviolable  principle  by  the 
neoliberal adherents of real-world capitalism. That freedom would have to 
be limited if, in the public interest, stricter owner liability is to be used to 
prevent the entire system – the financial market and its functions – from 
getting dangerously out of kilter.
(2) Restrictions via deposit liability are just one example of a general 
strategy:  that  of translating a collective evil  into individualized costs The 
subject  of  this  kind  of  ceiling  are  opportunities  for  free-riding  and 
31 Cf. e.g. Adrian Blundell-Wignall/Gert Wehinger/Patrick Slovik, "The Elephant in 
the  Room:  The  Need  to  Deal  With  What  Banks  Do",  in:  OECD  Journal. 
Financial Market Trends, Vol. 2009/2.
32 Cf. the German weekly  Die Zeit,  February 12, 2009, p. 19f.:  "Das schwarze 
Loch". According to this, the GNP of Hungary in 2008 was approximately 152 
billion dollars (152 thousand million dollars).  AIG’s total assets were 1 trillion 
dollars.
33 E.g.  Hans-Werner Sinn,  Casino Capitalism.  How the Financial  Crises Came 
About and What Needs to be Done Now, Oxford 2012.
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exernalising costs. Translating into the language of costs serves to prevent 
or minimize that evil. 
A collective (= public) evil – such as corrupt officials – is one whose 
effects the members of a community cannot escape. Here, the collective 
evil  is  the collapse of  the financial  market  together with  those functions 
whose  performance  is  a  public  or  collective  good.  In  this  example,  the 
individualized  costs  are  the  financial  losses  incurred  by  the  individuals 
jointly responsible for the evil – in this case, return-hungry investors from 
the affluent and middle classes and their professional agents.
Another  proposal  incorporates  the  same  strategy  of  translating 
collective  evils  in  individualized  costs.  The  proposal  is  to  regulate  the 
assumption of new debt by systemically important players in the financial 
sector.  Debts taken on in  order to ensure solvency should be tied to a 
deterrent,  legally  binding  condition  that  the  bonds  concerned  be 
compulsorily converted into stocks, thereby forcing risk-taking investors to 
accept losses of value and increased (borrowing) costs. Debts of individual 
financial  institutions  that  endanger  the  system  would  then  manifest 
themselves in individual cost accounts.34
A version of this is the debt-equity-swap, i.e.  the transformation of 
demands of an endangered bank by the creditors in property-rights of the 
creditors  with  respect  to  the  bank.  This  debt-equity-swap  would  in  the 
current European financial crisis contain the socialisation of losses, which 
are actually the losses of private investors and shareholders. In this way 
the boundary between private and public interests would be secured, since 
the private interest of investors and the bank’s shareholders in a rescue of 
their bank with tax money could not be secretly passed of as public interest.
The overall aim here is to translate collective evils into the language 
of the market, i.e. prices for the external effects on society as a whole of the 
actions of market participants.35 This  would,  for the first  time,  oblige the 
34 This proposal comes from Dennis Snower, President of the Kiel Institute for the 
World Economy, "Gläubiger zu Aktionären", cf.  Financial Times Deutschland, 
March 11, 2010, p. 24. 
35 For the German social scientist Claus Offe, the difficulties of this translation are 
among  the  fundamental  problems  of  real  existing  capitalism.  Cf.  C.  Offe, 
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market to take note of these evils. It would be an attempt to build into the 
motivations  of  market  participants  a  substitute  for  the  political  citizen’s 
perspective of collective goods and evils. After all, the adoption of such a 
perspective has no place in the rationality of players as market participants. 
For,  as  we  have  already  noted,  the  contribution  made  by  a  market 
participant to supplying or securing a collective good cannot be converted 
into an advantage over market rivals unless there are other market players 
concerned with the good of  the community.  Rationally,  however,  for  the 
market participant that advantage is key. 
IV. Conclusion
Political practitioners and academic theoreticians of democracy so far 
have mainly examined boundaries under one aspect only:  Who must be 
included into decision making processes and who may be excluded? The 
question  of  inclusion  and  exclusion  is  certainly  significant.  It  is  also 
important  as  regards  the first  problem of  size  of  democracy which was 
discussed in the beginning, that is, as regards the problem that the circle of 
people  concerned  often  is  so  broad  that  their  participation  in  political 
decisions is severely hindered. Part of the solution of this problem of size 
lies in answering the question who "really"  has to be included and who 
does not.
But the examination of what the properties and the use of borders in a 
democratically  built  society  are  must  not  be  restricted  to  this  aspect. 
Boundaries  in  a  democracy  should  be  examined  just  as  carefully  as 
boundaries in ecology currently are.36 A functional property of boundaries is 
"Kapitalismus  und  seine  sozialen  Schäden.  Überlegungen  zu  Möglichkeiten, 
den Gesellschaftsvertrag zu komplettieren", Ms. January 2010.
36 Cf. Johan Rockström et al., Planetary Boundaries: Exploring the Safe Operating 
Space for Humanity, in: Ecology and Society 14 (2009). J. Rockström, A safe 
operating space for humanity, in: Nature 461 (September 24, 2009), pp. 472-
475.  Paul  R.  Ehrlich/Peter  M.  Kareiva/Gretchen  C.  Daily,  Securing  natural 
capital  and expanding  equity  to  rescale  civilization,  in:  Nature  486 (June 7, 
2012), pp. 68 - 73. Ted Nordhaus/Michael Shellenberger/Linus Blomqvist, "The 
Planetary Boundaries Hypotheses. A Review of the Evidence" (Breakthrough 
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their role of disrupting causal chains. The demarcations described in the 
examples are employed to extend the political space for decisions through 
such  disruptions.  They  are  supposed  to  help  free  modern  Western 
democracies from hostage-taking by capitalist financial markets. "Too big to 
fail" is but a harmless sounding expression for this hostage-taking, which 
reveals the second problem of size for today’s democracies.
The demarcations are undertaken in laws or legal regulations, that is, 
in  sanction-enforced  prohibitions,  commands,  permissions,  and  in 
incentives  that  combine prohibitions,  commands and permissions.  But  it 
would be naive to suppose that political legislation is immune to the power 
of  economic  agents.  For  example,  British  pension  fonds hold  shares  in 
BP.37 That certainly did not encourage the British government to push BP 
for tightened security standards after the oil disaster in the Gulf of Mexico in 
2010. Big US-financial institutes in 2010 invested 1,4 million dollars per day 
for  three  months  into  lobby-work  in  US-American  congress  in  order  to 
influence consultations about the regulation law by the senators Dodd and 
Frank.38 In Brussels alone 2000 full-time lobbyist of the financial industry 
beleaguer the present legislators.39
In order to allow for a policy of intelligent demarcation and thereby 
support  democracy  this  influence  of  economic  agents  simply  has to  be 
pushed back. With their influence big banks, monopolist rating-agencies or 
multinational corporate groups are able to dictate legal norms. Not rarely do 
political  scientists  play  down  this  ability  to  dictate  and  call  it  "private 
governance". One should follow Karl W. Deutsch and call it "power", that is, 
the  possibility  to  be exempt  from having  to  learn,  because one is  in  a 
position to impose one’s own will  on others.40 This power is systemically 
Institute), Oakland June 2012. 
37 Cf.  Frankfurter  Allgemeine  Zeitung,  July  7,  2010,  p.  19:  "Erste  Fragen  zur 
Systemrelevanz von BP".
38 Cf.  the German newspaper  Die Zeit,  October 13,  2011, p. 24:  "Chronik des 
Scheiterns".
39 Cf. Financial Times Deutschland, April 3, 2012: "Der Hase und der Igel".
40 "In a sense, it (power, L.W.) is the ability to afford not to learn", Karl W. Deutsch, 
The Nerves of Government, enlarged edition New York: Free Press 1966, p. 
111; see also p. 247.
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important, but only as a danger that accrues from coldly calculating self-
interest, stupidity and contempt for the weak.
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